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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN RE: BABY DOE, ] 
SYLVESTER ENO-IDEM ] 
Appellant, ] 
vs. ] 
JOHN AND MARY DOE, ] 
Respondents. ] 
> RESPONDENTS'BRIEF 
ON APPEAL 
i Priority 7 
1 Case No. 870476-CA 
RESPONDENTS1 BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondents agree with Appellant's statement of the case 
except as to the facts set forth hereunder: 
1. The natural father (appellant) returned to Nigeria due 
to his employment and to further his education (Petitioner's 
Exhibit "A", paragraph 4, appellant's brief), 
2. The natural father and mother were involved in a brief 
relationship near the first part of October 198 5 which culminated 
in a single act of intercourse.(Emphasis supplied) The natural 
mother was married, although separated, at the time of conception 
and did not intend to marry the natural father. Within a few 
days after said act of intercouse, appellant left the State of 
1 
Utah and the United States and the natural m<pther had no contact 
with him from October 1985 until he returned! in November 1986. 
She was unaware of his whereabouts during said period of time. 
(See Addendum, Deposition and Consent To Adaption, paragraph 3, 
TAB 1# hereinafter referred to as TAB 1). 
3. During the time appellant resided iri Nigeria, he did not 
contact the natural mother, nor inform her of his address or 
telephone number, or any way that she could contact him. ( 
Exhibit "A", paragraph 5, appellant's brief)J 
4. At the time of appellant's return po the United States 
in November 1986, he was newly married,and lust had a son of his 
own (ostensibly in Nigeria), (See Addendum! letter of natural 
mother dated 12/16/86, TAB 2ihereinafter referred to as TAB 2). 
5. The natural father did not contact 
to express that he wanted the child and did 
to proceed until February 13, 1987, more than three weeks after 
respondents' counsel 
hot want the adoption 
1987. (Record, pages 
3) 
respondents' counsel 
the adoption was finalized on January 21, 
52-5 3, hereinafter referred to as R.pp. 52-51: 
6. The sole contact by appellant with) 
prior to finalization of the subject adoption was a letter from 
the natural mother dated 12/16/86, advising that both she and 
appellant agreed with the subject adoption ^nd felt it was in the 
best interests of the child but expressed a desire to see the 
2 
child to be assured that all was well. (TAB 2, R.pp. 37,52-53). 
7. The natural mother was not aware that she was pregnant 
until sometime after she had conceived. She was unable to 
contact appellant because he was out of the country and she had 
no way to contact him. (See Addendum, Transcript of October 2, 
1987 hearing, page 3, TAB 3i hereinafter referred to as TAB 3.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
APPELLANT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING. 
A. It was not impossible for appellant [to file 
the required paternity notice througth no fault of 
his own. 
B. Due process does not require actual 
father before his rights may be terminated. 
notice to an unwed 
and does not violate 
Is of the instant 
C. 78-30-4(3) U.C.A. is constitutional 
due process as applied to the fact 
appeal. 
D. The exceptions to the statutory cutorr as reflected in 
the Ellis & Baby Boy Doe cases hav^ no application to 
this case. 
POINT II APPELLANT HAS NO EQUITABLE RIGHT TO HIS CHILD WHICH 
TRANSCENDS THE STATES' INTEREST IN SPEEDILY IDENTIFYING 
ADOPTIVE PARENTS AND SECURELY CONCLUDING ADOPTIONS. ±, 
POINT III THE BEST INTERESTS OF BABY BOY DOE WILL BE SERVED BY 
HIM REMAINING WITH HIS ADOPTIVE PARENTS. 
POINT IV 78-30-14(7) U.C.A. DOES NOT EXPAND THE TIME SET FORTH 
IN 78-30-4(3) U.C.A. TO FILE A NOTICE OF CLAIM OF 
PATERNITY. 
4 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
APPELLANT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING. 
The appellant urges at some length that his circumstances 
fall within the parameters of the case of Ellis v Social Services 
Department of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 
615 P2d 1250 (Utah 1980). He argues, therefore, that he should 
be afforded a reasonable opportunity i.e. an evidentiary hearing 
to show that is was impossible for him to file the required 
statutory notice through no fault of his own and that he came 
forth within a reasonable time and did file his notice of 
paternity. (Emphasis supplied) In Wells v Childrens* Aid 
Society, 681 P2d 199 (Utah 1984), the court, citing Ellis 
extended the "reasonable opportunity to comply with the statute" 
after the statutory filing deadlines had passed, only in cases 
"when it is first shown that it was 'impossible1 for the father 
to file* through no fault of his own1 Id.at 207-08). 
Surely, appellant, who is a college educated Nigerian and 
has attended Weber State College in Ogden, Utah, must be presumed 
to know that sexual intercourse may result in conception and the 
ultimate birth of a child. His acknowledged statement, that 
during a 13 month absence from the United States and the natural 
mother with whom he claimed he was involved in an 8 month love 
5 
piim, (Exhibit "A", 
lef), cannot justify 
affair to whom he was strongly bonded and w|th whom he intended 
to resume his relationship upon his return, yet he had absolutely 
no contact with her, neither did he furnish ljier with his address 
or telephone number or any way to contact 
paragraphs 4, 5, & 6, and p.4 appellant's br 
his claim that is was impossible for him tlo file the required 
notice through no fault of his own (emphasis supplied). 
Appellant claims that when the natural mother learned of her 
pregnancy, she attempted to contact him but was unable to do so. 
(See Addendum, Transcript of October 2, lj 
hereinafter referred to as TAB 3). 
987 hearing TAB 3, 
Had appellant, in fact, maintained the [close relationship 
which he claimed existed with the natural mpther, he would have 
provided her with his address and phone number and she could have 
notified him upon learning of her pregnancy, 
to appellant's own fault (emphasis sd] 
notification could not be made. Accordingly, appellant should 
Clearly, it was due 
pplied) that such 
ow that he did not 
the statute, 
afforded due process 
adoption proceeding 
not be allowed an evidentiary hearing to stj 
have a reasonable opportunity to comply with 
Appellant next contends that he was not 
in that he was not notified of the subject] 
nor of the birth of his child. In Wells, the Utah Supreme Court 
cited with approval the United States Supreme Court case of Lehr 
v Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) which dealt with a New York 
statute containing similar filing requirements as the Utah 
6 
statute. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the argument that an 
unwed father was entitled to notice of the adoption proceedings 
and held that he must comply with the filing requirements of the 
New York statute. The court, in Wells, specifically stated: 
"...due process does not require that the father of an 
illegitimate child be identified and personally notified before 
his parental rights can be terminated..." Id. at 213. 
If, in fact, the requirement of due process articulated in 
Ellis and In Re Adoption of Baby Doe 717 P2d 686 (Utah 1986), 
required actual notice of either the birth of the child, the 
statutory filing requirements or the adoption proceeding itself, 
to an unwed father before his failure to file an acknowledgement 
of paternity would constitute a bar, the adoptive processes of 
the state would be totally chaotic. It would mean, in a case 
such as this, that any time a "one night stand" occurred and the 
unwed father was unaware that the act of intercourse had resulted 
in conception, he could come back at any time, three months, six 
months, or even six years later and disrupt and void the 
adoption process that had occurred soon after the birth of the 
child. A similar claim could be made if he were unaware of the 
statutory requirement or the adoption proceeding itself. It is 
submitted that such an interpretation was never contemplated by 
the legislature in its adoption of the Utah statute. 
A comprehensive treatment of the state of the law in Utah 
7 
All four cases have 
the filing of an 
regarding adoptions is contained in the article, The Adoption 
Conundrum, Part 1# Utah Lawyer Alert, Vol. 87L No. 4. (See 
Addendum, TAB 3 hereinafter referred to ap TAB 3 ) • Therein, 
Professor Lynn Wardle of the Brigham Young University Law School 
analyses the statutory notice filing requirements of 78-30-4(3) 
U.C.A. in light of four recent Utah Suprem|e Court cases i.e. 
Ellis, supra, Wells, supra, Baby Boy Doe, sutira, Sanchez v L.D.S 
Social Services, 680 P2d 753 (Utah 1984). 
held that 78-30-4(3) U.C.A., requiring! 
acknowledgement of paternity prior to the petition for adoption 
being filed by adoptive parents is constitutional and valid. In 
Wells and Sanchez, the Court held that unwed fathers had not 
complied with the statute, however, the Requirements of due 
process had been met. In the cases of Ellis and Baby Boy Doe, 
the Court, in essence, held that the statute Iviolated due process 
as applied, and remanded the cases for evidentiary hearings. 
In an effort to assist judges and attorneys in determining 
which cases fall within the Ellis and Baby B<W Doe exceptions to 
the strict statutory requirements of 78-30-4(3) U.C.A., Professor 
Wardle cites four common threads running through those two 
decisions. (1) There was deceit or misconduct by the mother or 
her agents at a critical time which prejudiced the ability of the 
unwed father to comply with the notice-filing requirement. (2) 
In both cases, the child was conceived out of Utah by non-Utah 
residents and the mother came to Utah shortl^ before giving 
8 
birth. (3) The putative fathers registered their claim of 
paternity immediately upon learning of the statutory requirement. 
(4) Such registration occurred within a few days after the child 
was released for adoption. None of the four criterion mentioned 
above apply to the subject case. 
(1) There was no deceit or misconduct on behalf of the 
natural mother. The pregnancy resulted from a single act of 
intercourse and within a few days thereafter appellant left the 
United States with his whereabouts unknown. (paragraph 3, TAB 1) 
In the Ellis and Doe cases, there was an ongoing relationship 
between the parties wherein they had lived together for a period 
of time and marriage had been contemplated in both cases. Here, 
there was no such ongoing relationship. Appellant's claim that 
he was involved in a love affair with the natural mother for 
approximately 8 months and that they had developed a strong, 
bonded relationship which he intended to resume upon his return 
to the United States,(Exhibit "A", paragraphs 4 & 6 & p.4, 
appellant's brief), is expressly contradicted by the natural 
mother. Therein, she stated that in the first part of October, 
1985, she became involved in a brief relationship with appellant 
which resulted in a single act of intercourse. (See paragraph 3, 
TAB 1). Furthermore, his claim of a strong, bonded relationship 
is inconsistent with his admission that at no time during his 
9 
consistent with his 
absence in Nigeria. 
absence from the natural mother (approximately 13 months) did he 
contact the natural mother or inform her of his address or 
telephone number or any way to contact him, ( Exhibit "A", 
paragraph 5, appellant's brief) Rather his total lack of contact 
or communication with the natural mother is 
new marriage and fathering a child during hisj 
(See Addendum, TAB 2). 
(2) The child in the subject case was Conceived in Utah by 
the natural mother who was a Utah resident and by the appellant 
who resided in Utah at the time of conception and then left the 
United States voluntarily, 
(3) The subject case is clearly distirict from the Doe and 
Ellis cases. In Doe the putative father learned of the filing of 
an adoption petition on August 28th, one day after the petition 
had been filed on August 27th. He immediately contacted a 
lawyer, drove from Arizona to the State of Utah and filed a 
Notice of Claim of Paternity on August 20th. In Ellis, the 
putative father learned of the filing of the petition for 
adoption within a day or two of its filiAg. Thereafter, his 
attorney contacted the adoption agency in Utah on December 21st, 
and the Notice of Claim of Paternity was filed approximately 10 
days later on January 2nd. By contrast, the appellant in this 
case learned of the birth of his child in November, 1986, 
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concurred in its placement for adoption as reflected in the 
letter from the natural mother to counsel for respondents dated 
12/16/86 (TAB 2), and did not file a Notice of Acknowledgement of 
Paternity until January 13, 198 7, approximately two months after 
learning he was the father of the child. While appellant 
atteinpted to justify the lengthy delay between his knowledge of 
the birth of his child and the filing of the Notice of Claim to 
Paternity on the basis that he needed to confer and consult with 
his family in Nigeria and determine their wishes, the decision to 
assert such a claim was solely his as the natural father. Also, 
appellant's claim in paragraph 11 of Exhibit "A" in appellant's 
brief that it took several weeks for his family in Nigeria to 
respond to his consultations with them is inappropriate and 
should not be considered by the court inasmuch as said claim is 
raised for the first time on appeal. Nowhere in the previous 
pleadings filed in this matter with the court, has appellant 
contended that the delay in filing the Notice of Claim to 
Paternity resulted in any manner from any political or economic 
unrest in Nigeria. (See Statement of Facts, appellant's brief 
pages 3-5,; TAB 3) . 
(4) The registration of the acknowledgement of paternity 
did not occur within a few days after the child was released for 
adoption, but approximately 6 months later and approximately two 
11 
months after appellant knew of the birth of his child. 
The recent cases of K.B.E, In Re:,740 P2d 292 (Utah 1987) 
and K.O. v Denison, 748 P2d 588 (Utah 1988) decided by the Utah 
Court of Appeals are clearly distinguishable from the subject 
case. In K.B.E. the natural mother and her grandfather filed a 
petition for adoption on August 26th 1985 the morning of T.M.E.'s 
birth. The child's father filed an Acknowledgement of Paternity 
during the afternoon of the same day, after learning of the 
child's birth. There, the court held that the statute as applied 
violated due process. An evidentiary hearing was not deemed 
necessary inasmuch as the natural mother was not voluntarily 
terminating her parental relationship to place the child with new 
parents. Rather, she petitioned for joint custody for herself 
and her grandfather. In addition, the natural father filed his 
Acknowledgement of Paternity within just a few hours of the 
Petition for Adoption. In the subject case, by contrast, the 
natural mother did relinquish her parental rights within two days 
of the birth of the child, said child w^s placed with the 
respondents (the adoptive parents), the adoption was finalized on 
January 21, 1987, and the adoptive parents and the child have 
continuously resided together and bonded as a family unit for 
approximately 22 months. Also, in the subject case, the 
appellant did not file his Acknowledgement of Paternity within a 
12 
few hours of the filing of the petition for adoption, but 
approximately six months later and two months after he knew of 
the birth of the child. 
In K.Q., the court held that the natural grandmother who had 
raised and cared for her grandchild for a period of more than 6 
years since birth, was entitled to notice of the subject adoption 
proceeding and to be heard regarding her fitness. In the subject 
case appellant has been involved in no such care and raising of 
his child. Further, despite his statement that he was involved 
in a love affair with the natural mother for 8 months and had a 
strong bonded relationship with her which he intended to resume 
upon his return to the United States, for 13 months he had no 
contact with the natural mother, neither did he provide her with 
his address, phone number or any way to contact him. In 
addition, he fathered another child in Nigeria during his absence 
and was newly married at the time of his return to the United 
States. (See Statement of Facts, page 4 and Exhibit "A", 
paragraphs 4,5,6 and 7 appellant's brief; also TAB 2). 
The comments of the trial court based upon the totality of 
these circumstances, are very perceptive: "... if you open this 
one up, our statute is absolutely meaningless, would be 
meaningless altogether..." (p.5, TAB 3). The trial court did not 
err in refusing to grant appellant an evidentiary hearing. 
13 
POINT II 
APPELLANT HAS NO EQUITABLE RIGHT T(f) HIS CHILD WHICH 
TRANSCENDS THE STATES' INTEREST IN SPEEDILY IDENTIFYING 
ADOPTIVE PARENTS AND SECURELY CONCLUDING ADOPTIONS. 
After examining the fundamental rights o|f parents to sustain 
a relationship with their children, the Court stated In Re J.P., 
648 P2d 1364, 1374-75 (Utah 1982): 
"...Parents in different circumstanjces are apparently 
entitled to different degrees of protection for 
their parental rights. Parental rights are at their 
apex for parents who are married. Some variation 
exists among unwed fathers. While those who have 
fulfilled a parental role over a considerable 
period of time are entitled to a high degree of 
protection, unwed fathers whose relationships to 
their children are merely biologicajl or very 
attenuated may, in some circumstanc 
of their parental status merely on 
finding of the 'best interest1 of tpe child..." 
jes, be deprived 
the basis of a 
The United States Supreme Court in f:he case of Lehr v 
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) likewise applied a rationale of 
variable parental rights where it referred to the rights of the 
parents as a counterpart of the responsibilities they have 
assumed. In its opinion, the Court elaborated that statement in 
reference to an unwed father who had no custodial, personal or 
financial relationship with the infant involved in that case. 
" When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment 
to the responsibilities of parenthood by coming forward 
to participate in the rearing of his child, his 
interest in personal contact with his child acquires 
substantial protection under the due process of the law 
...But the mere existence of a biological link does 
not merit equivalent constitutiona|l protection" Id. at 
261. 
14 
Justice Oaks, speaking for a unanimous court in Wells, 681 
P2d 199, 203 (Utah 1984), described the legitimate and compelling 
interest of the state as it relates to unwed fathers: 
"...The State has a strong interest in speedily 
identifying those persons who assume the parental 
role over such children not just to assure immediate 
and continued physical care, but also to facilitate 
early and uninterrupted bonding of a child to its 
parents. The state must, therefore, have legal means 
to ascertain within a very short time of birth whether 
the biological parents (or either of them) are going 
to assert their constitutional rights and fulfill their 
corresponding responsibilities or whether adoptive 
parents must be substituted." 
The court further emphasized the compelling state interest 
in adoption cases: 
11
 ...If infants are to be spared the injury and pain of 
being torn from parents with whom they have begun 
the process of bonding and if prospective parents 
are to rely on the process in making themselves 
available for adoptions, such determinations, 
must also be final and irrevocable." Id at 206-07. 
Recognizing the significant and important interest of the 
State in placing children swiftly and securely for adoption our 
Supreme Court, in rejecting the claim of a mother to recover her 
child 8 months after she had given it up for adoption, stated: 
"It is and should be a policy of the law to so operate 
as to encourage the finding of suitable homes and 
parents for children in that need. It is obvious 
that persons who might be willing to accept a child 
for adoption would be more reluctant to do so if a 
consenting parent is permitted to arbitrarily change 
her mind and revoke the consent, and thus desolate 
the plan of the adoptive parents and bring to naught 
all of their time, effort and expense and emotional 
15 
involvement... A moment's reflection will reveal that 
to the degree that such commitments are given respect 
and solidarity, so they can be relied upon, persons 
desiring children will be willing to accept and give 
them homes. Conversely, to the degree that such 
commitment can easily be withdrawn and the adoptive 
plan thus destroyed, such persons will tend to be 
discouraged from doing so." In Re Adoption of F, 488 
P2d 130, 134 (Utah 1971) 
While the above case involved a situation where the natural 
mother sought to revoke her consent, the Court as noted in the 
foregoing decisions, has clearly determined that in cases of 
unwed fathers, their rights are least where they merely have a 
biological link to the subject child. The same reasoning applies 
to them as it would to the mother in the case cited above. The 
adoptive parents must have the assurance that the statute does 
contain a cut-off provision which will be honored by the courts 
particularly where, as here, a single sexual act resulting in 
conception occurred after which the appellant left the country 
for a period of more than one year, during which time no 
communication was had with the natural mother, neither did she 
know of his whereabouts. Further, no interest of any kind had 
been expressed by the appellant even as regards the natural 
mother as demonstrated by his complete lack of communication. 
Subsequently, 13 months later, the appellant returned to the 
United States and learned that his child had been born, however, 
he delayed taking any steps to file the required Notice of 
16 
Paternity for approximately 2 months. To allow him to open the 
subject adoption file, have an evidentiary hearing and seek to 
set aside the adoption entered into in good faith by the adoptive 
parents and the subject child nearly two years ago would 
completely frustrate the adoption process, both for agencies and 
persons placing children for adoption as well as for those 
parents willing to come forward and provide homes for adoptive 
children, 
POINT III 
THE BEST INTERESTS OF BABY BOY DOE WILL BE SERVED BY HIM 
REMAINING WITH HIS ADOPTIVE PARENTS. 
Appellant's contention that because he is a black Nigerian 
and the natural mother is white, somehow the best interests of 
the child will be better served by being returned to him than 
remaining with the respondents as the adoptive parents, is 
illogical and has no basis in fact. Appellant, as the natural 
father, has had absolutely no relationship with the child. 
Neither has he participated in the rearing of said child although 
he now expresses a desire to do so. Conversely, the respondents 
as the adoptive parents, immediately made themselves available 
and provided a home for the child at the time it was required. 
They did so because of their love for the child and their desire 
to provide a good home, where appropriate nuturing, physical and 
17 
emotional could occur. They also acted in reliance upon the 
consent given by the natural mother. Appellant's objection to 
the subject adoption was filed with counsel for the adoptive 
parents on or about February 13, 1987, nearly three weeks after 
the adoption had been finalized. The adoptive parents are the 
only parents this child has ever known. The bonding which 
commenced on or about July 20, 1986 has continued now for almost 
two years. Clearly, the best interests of this child dictate 
that he remain in the home of his adoptive parents. 
POINT IV 
78-30-14(7) U.C.A. DOES NOT EXPAND THE TIME SET FORTH IN 78-
30-4(3) U.C.A. TO FILE A NOTICE OF CLAIM OF PATERNITY. 
Appellant assjerts the rather novel argument that 78-30-14(7) 
U.C.A. which provides that the petition for adoption shall not 
be granted until the child has lived in the home of the adoptive 
parents for 6 months, in some way expands the statutory cut-off 
period of 78-30-4(3) U.C.A. beyond the time of filing the 
petition for adoption and up to a period of six months. He then 
attempts to justify his delay in filing the acknowledgement of 
paternity due to mistaken advice which he received from someone, 
that he had six months in which to file his acknowledgement of 
paternity. What the appellant thought or understood the law to 
be is neither material nor relevant. All of the cases which have 
considered the statutory cut-off provisions bf 78-30-4(3) U.C.A. 
18 
i.e. Ellis, Wells, Sanchez, and Baby Doe, have held the statute 
constitutional. None of those decisions or any other to the 
knowledge of respondents' counsel, by either the Utah Court of 
Appeals or the Utah Supreme Court have ever mentioned, or 
considered 78-30-14(7) U.C.A. as expanding the statutory cut-off 
time for an unwed father to file an acknowledgement of paternity 
to six months. 
CONCLUSION 
To allow appellant to open the subject adoption file and 
have an evidentiary hearing, would open a Pandora's box of 
immeasurable proportions. If, in fact, notice of the birth of a 
child, the subject adoption proceedings or the statutory 
requirements were required, it would mean in a case such as this, 
that anytime a "one night stand" occurred and the putative father 
was unaware that the act of intercourse resulted in conception, 
or unaware of the adoption proceedings or the statutory 
requirement, he could come back at any time, and disrupt and void 
the adoption process that had occurred soon after the birth of 
the child. It is respectfully submitted that such an 
19 
interpretation of the statute was never contemplated by the 
legislative framers. Further, this case does not come within the 
Ellis and Baby Doe exceptions in that it was not impossible for 
appellant to file the required notice through no fault of his 
own. Finally, to allow someone as the appellant to have an 
evidentiary hearing when he failed for two months to file an 
Acknowledgement of Paternity after learning that he fathered a 
child and the child had been placed for adoption some six months 
earlier, would result in total chaos insofar as the adoption 
processes of the State of Utah are concerned and would render the 
adoption statutes unreliable and meaningless. 78-30-4(3) U..C.A. 
as applied to the facts of this case does not violate due 
process. The trial court correctly denied appellant's petition 
to open the adoption file and have an evidentiary hearing. The 
decision^ of the trial court should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this Jj^ day of May, 1988. 
TIM W. HEALY ^-^ 
Attorney for Rejspondents 
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TIM W. HEALY 
Attorney for Petitioners 
86J 25th Street 
Oyden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 621-2630 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, &TATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION 
OF 
INFANT DOE aka 
A Minor Child. 
DEPOSITION & CONSENT 
I'O ADOPTION 
Cjivil No. 'fPtfr 
Come now SHELLY D. BROPHY and heir hiisband, LARRY BROPHY 
and being first duly sworn upon their oath (depose and say: 
1. That the deponents are married to each other and have 
two children previously born as issue of that marriage, 
2. That the parties have been separated at various poili»di. 
during; the past three - four years and havjj lived apart ioi signii i 
cant periods of that time. 
3. That on or about the first part of October 1985, your 
affiant, SHELLEY D. BROPHY, became involve d in a bliet re la L i oiibh i p 
with a male person not her husband wi t.h whom she enyaqed in a 
h act she conceived am 
in Ogdep Utah. The 
single act of sexual intercourse from whicl 
bore a child on the /jf day of July, *<1986 
natural father of said child is a Nigerian and left the United 
States within a few days after said act of intercourse. Your 
affiant, SHELLY D. BROPHY, has had no further contact with b.ml 
person since October 1985, and does not know his present wh<>re -
abouts. Your affiant does not intend to marry the father ol sd'd 
child and is presently married to yonr affiant, LARKY HKOPIIY . 
4. That your affiant, LARRY BROPHY, admils and aclnuwlui. 
that he is not the father of the aforesaid minor chiJri born 
on the / Q day of July, 1986 in Ogden, Utah. However, inasmuch 
as said child was born during the ma triage of Larry Brophy to 
Shelley D. Brophy your affiant undeistands that said child is 
DEPOSITION & CONSENT 
Page Two 
according 
presumed legitimate/to Utah law and he is, therefore, prepared 
to consent to the adoption of said child as set iorth heiemalUi. 
5. To the knowledge of your uifiants herein, the petition' / o 
for adoption have offered to adopt said child and to assume the 
duty of supporting, nurturing, educating and caring for said child 
agreeing that said child shall become their heir at law to share* 
equally in their estate. 
6. That the parties, youi air-ants herein, have specifically 
expressed the desire not to know the names of the adoptive parents 
and do hereby waive any rights which they possess to know their 
names, addresses and all details concerning their backgrounds and 
further declare that they have received some general information 
about them and are satisfied to make the placement.herein without 
further knowledge concerning them and that your affiants consent 
to said child being lawfully placed in the care, custody and conttol 
of petitioners for adoption, 
7. That your affiants v£ully, freely and vol unta ri 1 y cons« ni 
to the adoption of Infant Doe, the minor child, by the potitLoncis 
herein and they hereby surrender and release any and all rights 
which they now have or may have to the care, custody and contiol, 
affections, services and earnings ol said child. That they are 
aware of their legal rights in this matter and do hereby expressly 
state their desire that the petitioners for adoption may proceed 
to complete the adoption in a lawfuL manner. 
8. That neither of your affiants are in the military SIMVUMI 
of the United States of America nor serving with the armed forces 
of any nation with which the United States may be allied and do noi 
claim any rights or relief under the applicable laws pertaining 
thereto. 
9. That your affiants hereby waive notice ol the tune and 
place of any hearing or trial in the above cause, consent to the 
hearing or trial therof at any time convenient to the Court and 
to the petitioners herein without any further notice to them and 
DEPOSITION & CONSENT 
Page Three 
hereby join in said Petition and respectfully request that the 
Petition for Adoption be granted, 
10. That this consent to adoption is given freely without 
compulsion, payment or promises from anyone and that the best 
interest of all parties herein shall be served by this adoption 
and that the undersigned are not currently under the influence of 
medications, drugs or intoxicants or in any manner unable to 
understand the importance and finality of this Consent to Adoption 
that all rights have been fully explained to their satisfaction. 
DATED this v day of July,1986. 
f SHELLEY XT. BROPHY V. 
LARK£"A. BROPHY C y^r^— 
is 
Signed in the Prese 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
'S / U . J O 
Jiud W J/ 
J' 
OAA' 
1 THE COURT: Is this adoption ready? 
2 MR. HEALY: Yes, Your Honoj. 
3 MR. C/VT.VER: Merlin Calver.for the petitioner in 
4
 this matter, Your Honor. We both submitted memorandums and 
5 briefs, which I think basically covef' all ih*3 issues. What 
6 we're asking the Court to do is to have an evidentiary 
7 hearing regarding the placement of tne baby in this matter. 
8 Basically, what we * re asking is baseld upon the facts, the 
9 natural father was unaware that there was, in fact, a child. 
10 He was out of the country during anyl statutory time, and 
11 therefore, he could not have protected his rights had he 
12 known. And upon his returning to the country and becoming 
13 aware that he was a fnthnr, he thought- 1^ had fllrd within 
14 the statutory time. His understanding was he had six 
15 months from placement, and he filed before the six months i\v 
16 before the adoption was final. 
17 THE COURT: Now, his understanding is not the 
18 -question. The question, basically ,| is whether or not he had 
19 a reasonable opportunity. 
20 MR- C/VLVER: He did not have a reasonable 
21 opportunity3 Your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: According to Ithe letter from the 
23 J natural mother, he was back in the United Htaten for a 
I 
24 | couple of months before he did anything. 
25 I MR. CALVER: I think, though, that the real L S P U P 
at the time of the placement , even though — I think that 
Mr. Healy would argup either way. If I werp to say, well, 
immediately upon his return to the country, he filed for 
acknowledgement of paternity, Mr. Healy would then state, 
well, that was too late, also, because he filed after thp 
child was placed and after the petition was filed. And the 
Court in a couple of cases I've submitted, said that if the 
father was not aware and did not have an opportunity to fjle 
the acknowledgement of paternity, that an evidentiary hearinp 
may be appropriate, and that?s what we're asking for is an 
evidentiary hearing. 
THE COURT: How long after he arrived back in the' 
United States did he file? 
MR. CALVRR: it would have been approximately two 
months. And these are the kinds of things that I think 
should be brought before thp Court, but I'll proffer, the 
natural father is not an American citizen. He was not awnm 
of the American judicial process. He was informed by 
someone, not an attorney, that he had six months. He 
wanted to confirm that the child was his. He wanted to have 
some time to consult his family in Nigeria regarding what 
their desires were regarding the child. The Nigerians have 
an extended family system. H^ had to consult with his 
father and his mothpr to get their opinion. As soon as hp 
got their opinion on what they felt he should do, he filed 
2 
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24 
25 
she found out, she 
he was out of the 
within the six month period. And I truthfully think that 
any time he would have filed after the placement, he would 
have fallen under some of these Supreme Court cases. But 
they also say he has a right to due process. If he was not 
aware of the child — and I can proffer, also, the mother 
was not aware of the child at the time that the father left 
the country. The mother was not awarfe that she was pregnant 
for quite some time. And as soon as 
attempted to contact the father, and 
country, and she had no way to contact him. I think itfs a 
proper matter for an evidentiary hearing, and that's what 
we!d like to ask. 
MR. HEALY: Your Honor, in 
^another lengthy statement of facts arid briefs, and I think 
the Court can clearly see from the cases that have been 
cited, that the only time our Supreme Court, and subsequently 
the Court of Appeals, has allowed an|evidentiary hearing, 
have been in those cases where it appears that due process 
as applied may have bppn violated. In the two cases that 
are exceptions to that rule that arel cited there are Baby 
Doe and Baby Ellis. Those are both (circumstances that are 
totally different than the one beforje the Court now. Thosp 
acknowledgements were filed within a day or two after the 
matter came to the attention of the jpunitLve father. The 
other significant thing is those weije ongoing, long-term 
response, wefve submit!r 
4 
1 relationships, where marriage had been discussed in each 
2 instance, and where there had been some ongoing period for 
3 J a period of many months, where there had been those regular 
and daily contacts. I think the great concern that has been 
5 expressed here, Your Honor, is that number one, this did not 
6 occur immediately. He took a couple of months to consult 
7 with his family, to talk to different people, to decide, 
8 should I do something about this child. He may be a 
9 Nigerian, but he also has attended Weber State College, and 
10 certainly is not naive as to U.S. matters and customs. 
11 The other thing, Your Honor, is the fact that if 
12 thp Court were to permit this type of a situation to grow 
13 into evidentiary hearings and to overturn placements Vov 
14 adoption,thfese one-night, stands — which is clear from the 
15 deposition and consent of the natural mother, it was a 
16 single act of intprcoursp — would clearly jeopardize our 
17 adoption processes. People could come back at any time and 
18 say, well, gee, I just didn't know. And as our Supreme 
19 Court has said, and as the United States Supreme Court has 
20 said, actual notice is not a requirement to be met in this 
21 particular circumstance. 
22 I I would submit for that reason, Your Honor, that 
first of all, this casp does not fall within the Ellis and 
24 J Doe exceptions, and secondly, any time that did occur, far 
25 exceeded what would havp been a reasonable opportunity. 
23 
Mr. Calver said they must have an opportunity. The Court 
said they must have a reasonable opportunity. I submit that 
waitinp; two months In mnkn nurh n dollorminnt ion \r fnr 1 on 
long. 
THE COURT: I've read your briefs in this thing, 
and my opinion, if you open this one up, our statute is 
absolutely meaningless5 would be meaningless altogether. I 
think itfs finalized5 and itfs a standard one. He had 
reasonable opportunity for two months. I do not think it-
would go for hearing, and I reject jJour petition. 
MR. CALVER: Your Honor, c[< 
decision on that for our files? We 
that decision, and I would need something. 
THE COURT: It's on the record. 
MR, CALVER: Thank you. 
THE COURT: There will be a minute entry. There's 
also a record over here. There's also your briefs. 
MR. HEALY: Thank you. 
ould we have a written 
would attempt to appeal 
.Transcript of Hearing held October 2, 1987 
Reported by: pv^j. e c u uy . , 
Vicki L. Godfrey 
Official Court Reporter' 
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A D O P T I O N 
THE ADOPTION CONUNDRUM 
PART I 
Professor Lynn D. Wardle1 
Contested child custody cases often present courts with exquisite 
dilemmas. None are more poignant than contested adoption cases. 
Two recent controversial decisions of the Utah Supreme Court 
highlight the adoption conundrum. In In re Adoption of Baby Doe, 
111 P.2d 686 (Utah 1986) the court probably reached the right result 
for the wrong reasons. In In re Halloway, 732 P.2d 962 (1986) the 
court probably reached the wrong result for the right reasons. Yet, 
both decisions may help to prevent future abuses and to preserve the 
fine balance of Utah's adoption law. 
In this article the Baby Boy Doe decision will be reviewed. In the 
next issue of Utah Lawyer Alert the Halloway decision will be 
assessed. 
The Baby Boy Doe Decision. 
In In re adoption of Baby Boy Doe,2 the Supreme Court of Utah, 
in a 3-2 decision, reversed the judgment of a Utah district court de-
nying a motion filed by an unwed father to vacate an adoption peti-
tion respecting his child. The man (A.) and the girlfriend (S.H.) had 
lived together out of wedlock in California for three and a half 
years. In June, 1984, when she was apparently six or seven months 
pregnant, S.H. left A. and moved to Utah to live with relatives, who 
discouraged her from having further contact with A. Nevertheless, 
S.H. continued to talk with A. by telephone and, in early August, a 
few weeks before the child was born, A. visited her in Utah for 
several days. She told him that she was considering adoption; he told 
her that he opposed adoption and wanted to rear the child. S.H. 
ostensibly agreed to resume living with A. and he went to Arizona to 
look for a job and for a place for them to live. On August 24, A. 
telephoned S.H. from Arizona to advise her that he had secured a 
job and a place to stay, and that he would return to California to 
pick up their belongings and move them to Arizona. The next day, 
S.H. gave birth to the Baby Boy Doe in Utah, at least a week 
prematurely. 
Two days later, on August 27, S.H. appeared in court and formal-
ly relinquished her parental rights and consented to the adoption of 
Baby Boy Doe\ S.H.'s sister-in-law had made arrangements for the 
baby to be adopted by an Oregon couple, whose relatives, the Burns, 
lived in Utah. The Burns filed an adoption petition in Utah in their 
own names the same day that S.H. relinquished her parental rights 
and were awarded temporary custody. The Oregon couple came to 
Utah and took custody of the child from the Burns the next day, 
August 28th, and three days later they returned to Oregon with Baby 
Boy Doe. 
Mr. A. attempted to contact S.H. from Arizona by telephone on 
August 27, but was thwarted by her relatives. He learned of the 
adoption on August 28. Thereupon he immediately contacted a 
lawyer and drove to Utah. He filed a notice of claim of paternity on 
August 29 and filed his motion to vacate the adoption petition on 
September 6. 
Utah Code Annotated §78-30-4(3) requires the father of a child 
born out of wedlock who wishes to claim parental rights and receive 
notice of adoption to file a notice of claim of paternity before a peti-
tion for adoption is filed. Mr. A. did not file his notice until two 
days after the filing of the adoption petition. The district court 
found that it was not impossible for appellant to have filed his notice 
of claim of paternity before the petition of adoption was filed, and 
that he had reasonable opportunity to do so. Accordingly, the 
district court rejected Mr. A's claim to parental rights and denied his 
motion to vacate the adoption petition. 
the majority, alnalyzed two issues on appeal. The first issue was 
whether the district court erred in rejecting Mr. A's allegation that 
the adoption petition was fraudulent because the Burns only intend-
ed to adopt the child if their out-of-state relatives did not adopt the 
child, and they gave the child to the out-of-state relatives less than 24 
hours after getting temporary custody. The Supreme Court of Utah 
noted that the district court had extensively explored this point, per-
sonally questioning the parties at the hearing, and had made an ex-
plicit finding of fact that the Burns had a good faith (if conditional) 
intention to adopt the child when they filed the adoption petition. 
The supreme court approved the trial court's analysis, emphasizing 
that "this determination was one which was particularly within the 
province of the fact finder".3 
The second issue addressed by the Supreme Court was whether the 
lower court erred in holding that Mr. A. was not denied due process 
of law because he had a "reasonable opportunity" to comply with 
the notice filing requirements of the Utah statute, and that it was not 
"impossible" for him to do so. The court reviewed the landmark 
decision in Elks v. Social Services Department of The Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.4 In that case the Utah Supreme 
Court upheld Section 78-30-4(3) as facially constitutional, but stated 
that if it was impossible for an unwed father to file the required 
notice within the statutory period of time, "through no fault of his 
own[,]. . . due process requires that he be permitted to show that he 
was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to comply with the 
statute."5 The court in Baby Boy Doe also stressed that "where a 
father does not know of the need to protect his rights, there is no 
'reasonable opportunity' to assert or protect parental rights."6 And 
while "actual notice is not required prior to termination of parental 
rights of an uijwed father under section 78-30-4(3)," this genet al rule 
only applies "where the putative father knows or should know of the 
birth and can Reasonably take the timely action required to avoid the 
statutory bar. r The totality of circumstances in Jhe BabxJB_oyJ?oe 
case, rather than any single factor,_BeJ^iiadedJLhejmajprityJhat Mr. 
&.' diTlioTTiaivjjiJ^ to comply with the 
statute in this case, and that it was "impossible^ for him to do so. 
The circumstances specifically noted by the court included "the 
clearly articulkted intent of the father to keep and rear the child, the 
full knowledge of that intent on the part of all involved, the 
representations made by the mother, the actions of her family, the 
premature birth, and the non-residency of the father coupled with 
his absence at the time of birth . . . . "8 
Justice Stewart wrote a strong dissenting opinion, joined by 
Justice Howe. The dissent was primarily concerned about the sug-
gestion in the majority opinion that in some cases actual notice of 
adoption might need to be given to the illegitimate father. In Ellis the 
court had emphasized that the "impossibility" that was the basis for 
the Ellis exception was only that the father "could not reasonably 
have expected his baby to be born in Utah."9 Inasmuch as Mr. A. 
knew long before the child was born that it would be born in Utah, 
he did not come within the Ellis exception. The due process analysis 
of the majority was contrasted with that used by the Supreme Court 
of the United States in Lehr v. Robertson,10 in which application ol a 
very similar New York statute to terminate the parental rights of an 
unwed fatherL whose efforts to establish a parental relationship with 
his child had been thwarted by the deliberate acts of the child's 
mother, was upheld. The dissent also emphasized that the majority 
decision effectively overruled the trial court's findings of fact that 
"[i]t was not impossible for Mr. Aguilar to have filed his Notice of 
Claim prior to the filing of the adoption petition . . . " and that he 
had "a reasonable opportunity to file the Notice of Claim before the 
petition to adopt was filed."n Finally, as a policy matter, the dissent 
emphasized that the majority ruling made "the validity of many 
adoption proceedings turn on the majority's notion of 'fairness' 
which woulcj create unpredictability" in many adoptions. 
The Adoption Proceedings in Baby Boy Doe were 
Statutorily I Defective. 
The Utah Supreme Court unfortunately overlooked some serious 
nonconstitutional deficiencies in the Baby Boy Doe case. The adop-
tion procedures utilized by the parties to effect an out-of- state child 
placement for adoption clearly violated the express statutory re-
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qmrement of both Utah and Oregon for inter-state adoptions Utah 
md Oregon, and approximately 40 others states, are parties to the 
Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children 12 Under the 
I C P C , any "person, corporation, association or other entity 
which sends, brings, or causes to be sent or brought any child to 
mother party state" is deemed to be a "sending agency" ,3 The Burns 
Jcarly were a "sending agency' under the Compact Article III of 
I C P C expressly prohibits any sending agency to 'send, bring, or 
iiuse to be sent or brought into any other party state any child for 
phcement in foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption ' 
unless all of the requirements of the compact are satisfied Among 
the requirements are that the appropriate public authorities in the 
receiving state be given written notice of the intent to bring the child 
to the state, that those authorities investigate the prospective adop-
tive parents, and that those authorities notify the responsible agency 
in the sending state 'that the proposed adoption does not appear to 
he contrary to the interests of the child ' Id It does not appear that 
my of the basic requirements of the I C P C for an interstate adop-
tion were satisfied in this case 
I he overwhelming weight of authority holds that the requirements 
of the I C P C apply to private adoptions, as well as adoptions 
through licensed agencies u A 1979 opinion from the Utah Attorney 
General unequivocally advised the Division of Family Services that 
the I C P C applies to private placements 15 Numerous official 
Secretariat Opinions of the I C P C Compact Administrator have 
held that the Compact applies to private placements 16 In In re 
\doption ofTMM ,17 the Montana Supreme Court ordered a child 
removed from the home of its prospective adoptive parents in Mon-
tana and returned to its biological mother in Mississippi because the 
requirements of the I C P C had not been observed ,8 Thus, the 
procedure employed by the parties in this case to effect a private in-
terstate placement for adoption violated the I C P C ,9 
Another nonconstitutional problem with the adoption in Baby 
Boy Doe that was overlooked or ignored by the Utah Supreme Court 
uas the conditional nature of the petition for adoption that was filed 
b\ the Burns Their intent, apparently, was to adopt Baby Boy Doe 
only if their out-of-state relatives did not adopt him as arranged The 
Supreme Court of Utah could easily have interpreted §78-30 4(3) to 
tut off the time for filing a notice of claim of paternity only if the 
ndoption petition is filed by the actual, ultimate adopting parents, 
not a conditional intermediary In fact, in light of the legislative 
Hhcme embodied in that section, that is the natural construction 
Section 78 10 4(3) provides not one but two "cut off" points before 
tthtch the putative father of a child born out of wedlock must file his 
notice of claim of paternity If the child is released to a licensed 
agency (an agency subject to strict professional scrutiny, regulation, 
and legally to be act in a very professional manner) the cut-off date is 
the date on which the mother relinquishes the child to the agency for 
adoption On the other hand, if the adoption is to be a 'private' 
adoption, not involving an agency, the cut off date is 'the filing of a 
petition [for adoption] by a person with whom the mother has placed 
the child for adoption /2° This language suggests that the legislative 
intended to cut off the right of the unwed father to file a notice of 
claim of paternitv in private adoptions when the couple actually 
adopting the child files a petition 
In Baby Boy Doe the Burns, who filed the adoption petition in 
Utah, were acting as an intermediary, unlicensed, nonprofessional 
child placement agency The Utah Supreme Court should have ruled 
that the filing of the adoption petition by them did not constitute 
"the filing of a petition by a person with whom the mother has plac-
ed the child for adoption' inasmuch as the Burns turned the child 
over to another couple for adoption less than 24 hours after filing 
their adoption petition and getting custody The court did not have 
to find the Burn's adoption petition was fraudulent or invalid to 
hold that it did not operate to cut off Mr A 's right to file a notice of 
claim of paternity, only that the petition was not filed by the person 
with whom Baby Boy Doe was ultimately "placed for adoption ' 
The "New" Due Process Anal}sis in Baby Boy Doe 
The due process anaKsis in Babv Boy Doe is intriguing 21 The case 
illustrates why the requirements of 'due process of law' cannot be 
reduced to a mechanical formula Justice Durham's majority opi-
nion in Baby Boy Doe demonstrates a special sensitivity to individual 
fairness and practical justice Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion 
reveals a remarkably perceptive understanding of the systemic prin-
ciples of "due process of law ' Justice Stewart is concerned that hard 
cases make for bad law Justice Durham is concerned that hard law 
makes for bad cases 
The majority opinion in Baby Boy Doe modifies the test for due 
process of law established in prior Utah adoption cases The seminal 
case, Ellis, was decided by the Utah Supreme Court in 1980 That 
case involved two residents of California, Mr Ellis and his fiance, 
who were engaged to be married and were expecting a child In July, 
just two weeks prior to their wedding, when the women was three or 
four months pregnant, and Ellis knew of the pregnancy, the woman 
termmated the engagement Five months later, just a few days 
before the child was to be born, the woman secretly traveled to Utah 
and arranged to place the child for adoption A few days later, on 
December 15, the child was born On December 19 the mother relin-
quished the child to a licensed adoption agency Somehow, about 
this time, Ellis discovered what the woman had done and where she 
had gone He immediately contacted his attorney who apparently 
contacted the Utah adoption agency by telephone on December 21 
On January 2, he filed his Notice of Claim of Paternity, and two 
days later he filed a complaint in Utah court seeking habeas corpus 
The trial court dismissed his complaint on the ground that his failure 
to file a timely notice of claim of paternity constituted a total nega-
tion of his parental rights 
The Supreme Court of Utah reversed, declaring Tn the usual 
case, the putative father would either know or reasonably should 
know approximately when and where his child was born It is con-
ceivable, however, that a situation may arise when it is impossible 
for the father to file the required notice of paternity prior to the 
statutory bar, through no fault of his own In such case due process 
requires that he be permitted to show that he was not afforded a 
reasonable opportunity to comply with the statute ' " Since both of 
the parties were California residents, the woman left California just 
prior to the birth of the child without advising the man where the 
birth was to occur, and since she relinquished custody just four days 
after birth, the court reversed and remanded to give the father an op-
portunity to show "that he could not reasonable have expected his 
baby to be born in Utah w23 The court said that he should be deemed 
to have complied with the statute if he could show that "he came 
forward within a reasonable time after the baby's birth '24 
Baby Boy Doe was quite a different case In Baby Boy Doe the 
father knew "approximately when and where his child [would be] 
born '25 Justice Durham's majority opinion carefully emphasized 
the 'no fault of his own" factors S H had agreed to move to 
Arizona with Mr A before the child was born, in reliance on her 
agreement to live with him A went to Arizona, got a job, secured 
housing, returned to California to gather their possessions and take 
them to Arizona, etc , S H 's family to prevented Mr A from talk 
ing with the mother the day that, unbeknownst to him, she released 
the child for adoption, etc Justice Durham makes a convincing case, 
that j4r_A__ieasonahly beliej^jiiai^SJfcLj^ould not releaselnelr -il-
legitimate_childJLojLadopJUon In that senseTrT was~^noJ^u3TaQus 
own' that he was surprised to learn that she had released the child 
for adoption only two days after it was born But it is questionable 
whether this was really the focus of the "no fault of his own Ellis 
test, the 'no fault" standard articulated in Ellis did not modify the 
father's belief that compliance with the statutory requirements was 
unnecessary, but the existence of conditions which made it impossi-
ble for him to comply with the statutory requirement of filing a time-
ly notice of claim of paternity The Ellis court only held that a father 
was entitled to an opportunity to show that "as a factual matter 
he could not reasonably have expected his baby to be born in Utah 
Justice Durham suggested a reformulation of the Ellis rule ap-
plication of U C A §78-30-4(3) to terminate the parental rights of 
the father of a child born out of wedlock does not violate due pro 
cess 'where the putative father knows or should know of the birth 
and can reasonably take the timely action required to avoid the 
statutory bar "26 However, even applying that test in Baby Boy Doe 
6 Utah Lawyer Alert 
it is not self evident that Mr A's failure to file was excusable, i 
knew of the approximate time and place of the birth of the child, I 
had personally visited the mother in Utah for several days before tl 
birth of the child, and could have 'reasonably take[n] the timely a 
tion' of filing a notice of claim of paternity then Justice Durha 
again emphasized the reasonableness of the father's belief that I 
would not need to file a notice of claim of paternity But this miss 
the point, the issue is not whether the father's decision to ignore (< 
to fail to inquire about) the requirement of filing a notice of claim i 
paternity was reasonable, but whether the requirement that he tal 
the timely action required is reasonable as applied to him That l 
the 'reasonableness' modifies the requirement that the father fi 
the notice before the cut off event, not his excuse for failure to cor 
ply27 
After Ellis, the next Utah decision to discuss due process in ado, 
tion cases was Wells v Children's Aid Society 2* In that case, a co 
pie of Moab high school students had sex and the girl became pre 
nant When the girl informed her boyfriend (Wells) of her probab 
pregnancy he shunned her When the girl was about eight wee! 
pregnant Wells was informed that the pregnancy was confirmed, ar 
he finally told his parents Wells' parents offered financial suppo 
to the pregnant girl and attempted to dissuade her from giving tl 
child up for adoption They also contacted an attorney and weie n 
formed that the putative father would need to file a notice of clan 
of paternity However, Wells and his parents decided not to file tl 
notice of claim of paternity because thev were not sure if the chii 
was really his, they decided to wait to see when the child was bon 
About a week before the child was to be born, the girl left Moab an 
went to Ogden to have the child The baby was born on Septemb 
23 Wells learned of the birth the same day, and immediately r 
mailed in the notice of claim of paternity However, the notice di 
not arrive until September 30 On September 24, the girl formall 
relinquished her parental rights and placed the child with a license 
agencv for adoption The next day the child was placed by the ager 
cv for adoption, and two days later the Department of Health issue 
a certificate of search verifying that no notice of claim of paternil 
had been filed A week later, Wells brought an action seekin 
custody of the child in alleging that the girl and the agency an 
fraudulently concealed facts surrounding the infants birth to deprn 
him of his parental rights The trial court held that the father wa 
denied 'a reasonable opportunity to file" his notice of claim o 
paternity and awarded him custody 
The Supreme Court of Utah unanimously reversed The court em 
phasized the concept of 'variable parental rights' which the Unite 
States Supreme Court had established in Lehr v Robertson, l e 
'the rights of the parent are a counterpart of the responsibilities the 
have assumed 29 The court distinguished Ellis because 
here the birth occurred in the same state as the father s 
residence, and neither the child's mother nor the agency was 
involved in any effort to prevent him from learning ot the 
birth or from asserting his parental rights Neither the mother 
nor the agency knew at the time the child was relinquished 
that the father was seeking to or intending to assert his paren 
tal rights The father had sufficient opportunity to [file h«s 
claim of paternity], including ample advance notice of the ex 
pected time of birth and the fact that the mother intended to 
relinquish the child for adoption, advice of co* isel , and 
> the copy of the form 30 
' Ellis had extended the^lreasonable opportunity to comply withjbt 
statute after the statutoxyjjjjng deadlines ]]ia3]passe3_ojily_in case; 
\ 'when it isTirst shown that lFwas 'impossible' for the father to rili 
^'throu^FTno faulFof his own ' ,3r~Pernaps most importantly, trfl 
court also held that a particularized, subjective standard of fairnes1 
was not required by the due process clause because the statute on u« 
face was sufficiently fair 'The legitimate state interests lr 
facilitating the adoption of young children and having the adoptior 
proceedings completed expeditiously that underlie the entin 
statutory scheme also justifv a trial judges' determination to requin 
all interested parties to adhere precisely to the procedural re 
quirements of the statute 32 
Conceptually, the decision in Baby Boy Doe is at odds with the 
principles articulated in Wells, which emphasized that individualized 
"luimess^lvTironT^ 
o\~ ''impossibility'^ and^'no fault of~his own" have been satisfied. 
Factually, however, Baby Boy Doe can be distinguished from Wells 
because the father and mother were Utah residents, no effort was 
made to prevent the father from learning of the birth or asserting 
parental rights, and the mother did not know at the time that she 
released the child for adoption that the putative father intended to 
assert his parental rights. Moreover, the putative father inWells had 
spoken to counsel before the birth of the child, knew specifically the 
Utah legal requirements, and made a deliberate decision to postpone 
the filing. Wells emphasizes that due process does not require the; 
state to indefinitely protect the parental rights of fathers who ge-i 
nuinely wish to assert their parental responsibilities; the rights of J 
sincere unwe i fathers may be cut off if they fail to act in the prompt) 
and timely manner required by the statute. » 
A month after Wells was decided, the Utah Supreme Court decid-
ed Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Services.33 In that case a woman, CSM, 
lived with a man, Sanchez, for four months and became pregnant by 
him. Sanchez proposed marriage, but CSM refused. Sanchez ex-
pressed the desire to have CSM and their baby live with him, but 
CSM told Sanchez that she was thinking of giving the baby up for 
adoption. He did not protest the mother's decision to place the child 
for adoption, but he said that he assumed that she would not. 
Together they discussed adoption with a counselor from an adoption 
agency. The counselor did not inform Sanchez of his right to file a 
notice of claim of paternity. Approximately seven months after 
TSM quit living with Sanchez she gave birth to the child. Three days 
later, on October 27, she formally relinquished the child to the agen-
;y for adoption. EarlieT that same day Sanche2 had visited her and 
he baby at the hospital after CSM had called him to come "if you 
want to see the baby one last time." He tried to sign the birth cer-
:ificate, but was not allowed to do so. That afternoon, after CSM 
had relinquished the child for adoption, Sanchez attempted unsuc-
cessfully to file his notice of claim of paternity; he succeeded in filing 
lis claim the next day. Later Sanchez filed a petition for writ of 
mbeas corpus to obtain custody of the child. The trial court dismiss-
id the petition. 
The Supreme Court of Utah affirmed by a vote of 3 to 1. Justice 
Stewart, writing for the majority, emphasized Wells and distinguish-
ed Ellis on the basis that Sanchez lived in Utah throughout the 
pregnancy, knew the time and place of the birth of the child, and 
;ould fairly be presumed to know the law of his state of residence.34 
The court emphasized the need for a clear and final "cut off" date to 
)rotect the profound interests of the adoptive parents, the natural 
nother, and the illegitimate child. "It is not too harsh to require that 
hose responsible for bringing children into the world outside the 
stablished institution of marriage should be required either to com-
>ly with those statutes that accord them the opportunity to assert 
heir parental rights or to yield to the method established by society 
o raise children in a manner best suited to promote their welfare 
adoption]."35 
Justice Durham, alone, dissented and attempted to distinguish 
Veils. She emphasized that Sanchez had consistently asserted his in-
erest in the child throughout the pregnancy, proposed marriage, 
mbliely acknowledged paternity, filed his notice of claim of paterni-
y within hours of learning of the statutory requirement, and was not 
a formed of her intent to release the child for adoption until it was 
oo late for him to file his notice of claim of paternity. Interestingly, 
u^tice Durham based her argument upon Article 1, section 7, of the 
itah Constitution. She did not attempt to distinguish the United 
laies Supreme Court's interpretation of the due process clause of 
he fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution in 
c/ir; apparently she would have the Utah Supreme Court hold that 
he due process clause of the Utah Constitution provides greater pro-
irction to the parental rights of fathers of illegitimate children than 
oes the United States Constitution. However, no other justice join-
d in her position. 
The analysis of the majority in Baby Boy Doe is difficult to recon-
lle with the emphasis in Sanchez on the need for a "firm cut off 
ale" for putative fathers of children born out of wedlock to assert 
their claim to paternal rights. The apparent incompatability of the 
two cases is underscored by the significant common facts: the 
putative fathers in both cases knew of the pregnancy, did not know 
that the law required them to file a notice of claim of paternity until 
it was too late, both men showed an interest in raising the child and 
expressed their desire to live with the mother and child, both fathers 
mistakenly believed that the mother would not give the child up for 
adoption, and both men acted promptly to assert parental rights as 
soon as they learned that the child had been placed for adoption. But 
the difference in results can be partially justified by several key fac-
tual differences: in Sanchez the father and mother were residents of 
Utah, the mother in Baby Boy Doe had agreed to resume living with 
the putative father, and the putative father was out of state seeking 
employment and housing in reliance upon that representation. 
Probably the loosest language in the majority opinion in Baby 
Boy Doe is that suggesting that "where a father does not know of the 
need to protect his rights, there is no 'reasonable opportunity' to 
assert or protect parental rights."36 Literally, this is an "actual 
knowledge" standard-and since most fathers of illegitimate children 
probably do not have "actual knowledge" of the specific re-
quirements of §78-30-4(3), literal application of that standard could 
create severely unjust uncertainty and confusion in adoption cases. 
However, this language does not stand alone. A little later in the 
same paragraph Justice Durham clarified that actual notice was not 
required "where the putative father knows or should know of the 
birth and can reasonably take the timely action required . . ,"37 It is 
worth noting, that the United States Supreme Court, in Lehr, ex-
pressly rejected the requirement that putative fathers of illegitimate 
children be actually notified of the requirements of the law: 
The possibility that (the father of an illegitimate child) failed 
to (comply with a statute requiring filing of a notice of claim 
of paternity) because of his ignorance of the law cannot be a 
sufficient reason for criticizing the law itself. The . . . 
legislature concluded that a more open-ended notice require-
ment would merely complicate the adoption process, threaten 
the privacy interests of unwed mothers, create the risks of un-
; 
necessary controversy, and impair the desired finality of 
adoption decrees [W]e surely cannot characterize the 
states' conclusion as arbitrary 38 
Conclus ion . 
In the final analysis, Baby Boy Doe makes a positive contribution 
to the fine balance of due process in terminating parental rights in 
adoption proceedings in Utah It provides a healthy counterbalance 
to Wells and Sanchez; in those cases the Utah Supreme Court 
demonstrated that it was willing to strictly apply the requirements of 
section 78-30-4(3) even if it meant that biological fathers who 
sincerely wanted to raise their children would be deprived of that op-
portunity forever The importance of compliance with the adoption 
statutes and the substantial risk that a dilatory unwed father runs 
have clearly been emphasized Utah 's serious commitment to protec-
ting the important interests of unwed mothers, adoptive parents, 
adopted children and to promptly insuring stability of adoptions 
have been vindicated by those decisions Ellis and Baby Boy Doe 
protect the competing interests and emphasize the importance of the 
rights of biological fathers and the significance of potential families 
They ensure that every putative father will be entitled to an 
oppor tuni ty-a t least a minimum period of time in which to inquire 
and a c t - t o claim parental rights These cases stand for the proposi-
tion that the "reasonable" time which must be provided may, in ex-
ceptional cases, extend beyond the cut off time set in §78-30 4(3) 
The question remaining, of course, is how can judges and at-
torneys tell when a case falls within the Ellis-Baby Boy Doe excep-
tion While that is not crystal clear now, there were four significant 
factual circumstances in both Ellis and Baby Bov Doe that might be 
expected in other exceptional cases First, there was deceit or 
misconduct on the part of the mother or her agents at a critical time, 
which prejudiced the ability of the putative father to comply with the 
notice-filing requirement Second, in both cases the child was con-
ceived out of Utah by non-Utah residents, and the mother came to 
Utah just a short time before giving birth to the child (there are 
choice-of-law and jurisdictional overtones here) Third, the putative 
fathers registered their notice of claim of paternity immediately 
upon learning of the statutory duty to do so Finally, such registra-
tion occurred within just a few days after the child was released for 
adoption 
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